Norway's Official Development Assistance

Romain Barbe

Founder · Mieux Donner · Reading time: 15 min

In 2024, only one country in the world devoted more than 1% of its gross national income to official development assistance: Norway, at 1.02%[1]. For comparison, the average among OECD Development Assistance Committee donors was 0.33% that same year, and France stood at 0.48%[2]. This generosity is not an accident: it results from a cross-party political consensus that has endured for fifty years. The 0.7% UN minimum target, set in 1970, was reached by Norway in 1980. The country subsequently set itself a more ambitious national target of 1%, maintained by every successive government, whether left or right.

Since the early 2020s, Norway has been questioning the fragmentation of its aid and what it can do to help even more. In January 2026, Minister of International Development Åsmund Aukrust launched Project Turning Point, a comprehensive overhaul of Norwegian aid policy that will be presented to Parliament in spring 2027[3]. The objective is to maintain aid volume at 1% of GNI while ensuring that every krone invested produces the greatest possible difference for beneficiary populations. This additional requirement, grounded in evidence and a clear investment framework rather than the accumulation of fragmented political priorities, makes Norway a valuable case study for understanding what a public donor can do with its international aid.

Norway in 2024: a leading donor

1% of GNI: a national political target, more ambitious than the UN goal

In 2024, Norway devoted approximately €4.8 billion to its official development assistance, equivalent to 55.7 billion Norwegian kroner[4]. Relative to the size of the economy, this effort represents 1.02% of gross national income, placing Norway first among donor countries in GNI share and making it the only OECD member to exceed 1% that year. For 2026, the Norwegian government proposed an aid budget of approximately €4.9 billion, still around 1% of projected GNI[5].

The 1% target is not an international objective: it is a Norwegian national one, more ambitious than the 0.7% UN target adopted in 1970. Norway has held this national target more or less continuously since the mid-2000s, after first reaching it in the 1970s. No other donor country has set such a high target.

Aid mostly delivered through grants and support to multilateral institutions

A distinctive feature of Norwegian aid, compared with other major European donors, is that it is delivered entirely in the form of grants. Norway records no loans in its ODA, unlike several neighbouring countries and notably France, where around 20% of bilateral aid is delivered as loans. This difference is not merely a question of accounting: loans do not always follow a pure impact logic, they can also reflect financial considerations specific to lending institutions, and their accounting in ODA through the so-called grant-equivalent method regularly raises questions about what the term aid actually covers. Grants, by contrast, offer more flexibility, ensure that resources reach beneficiary populations, and do not burden recipient countries with additional debt.

Governance of Norwegian aid

The administration of Norwegian aid is divided among three main entities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines the overall policy and governance. Norad, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, established on 1 December 1968, is the main operational agency: it manages most ODA grants, whether humanitarian or long-term development cooperation[6]. Norfund, the development finance institution, mobilises private capital for investments in low-income countries. The Ministry of Climate and Environment separately manages the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, launched in 2008 and now one of the largest climate-forest programmes in the world[7].

Five decades of political consistency

1968-1980: foundation and early achievement of the 0.7% target

The history of modern Norwegian aid begins with the creation of Norad on 1 December 1968. Before this date, Norwegian international aid was dispersed across multiple actors. The creation of a dedicated directorate under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs marked the shift from improvised aid to a structured public policy.

Two years later, in 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2626, setting a minimum target of 0.7% of GNI in official development assistance for economically advanced countries by 1975[8]. This target was rooted in an older tradition: as early as 1958, the World Council of Churches had proposed a target of 1% of GNI for total financial flows from rich countries to developing countries. The Pearson Commission, commissioned by the World Bank in 1969, narrowed the share dedicated specifically to ODA to 0.7%. This is the target that the UN adopted as a minimum in 1970. Norway, alongside Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark, reached it by 1980.

1980-2000: consolidation and the national 1% target

Over the following two decades, successive Norwegian governments, whether left- or right-leaning, consolidated a national consensus around a more ambitious target than the UN one: 1% of GNI. Aid was then split roughly evenly between bilateral and multilateral channels. The multilateral component took the form mainly of core contributions to UN agencies, the World Bank and regional development banks, without strong earmarking. The bilateral component concentrated support on a limited number of partner countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa.

2000-2020: growth in absolute volume and diversification

From the 2000s onward, Norwegian economic growth, driven by oil and gas revenues, multiplied the absolute volume of aid. The ratio to GNI remained stable around 1%, but the envelope grew from approximately 11 billion kroner in 2000 to nearly 40 billion in 2020[9]. This period also saw the thematic diversification of aid: the launch of the Climate and Forest Initiative in 2008, which became one of the largest climate-forest programmes in the world with approximately €2.9 billion disbursed over 2009-2021; the creation of the Knowledge Bank in 2018, structuring technical cooperation between public administrations; and the scaling up of humanitarian aid and engagement in fragile contexts.

This diversification, while reflecting growing political ambition, also marked the beginning of partnership fragmentation: a proliferation of channels, thematic funds and bilateral agreements with the same multilateral organisations. This observation fed, from the early 2020s onward, the questioning of Norwegian aid effectiveness.

What Norway actually funds

Priority to fragile contexts and low-income countries

In 2023, Norway allocated approximately €950 million of bilateral aid to highly or extremely fragile contexts, representing 26.6% of its gross bilateral aid[10]. This orientation reflects a political conviction: it is in these contexts that humanitarian needs are most acute and international aid plays the most structuring role, given the absence of other external sources of financing.

Norway also meets the international target of allocating at least 0.2% of its gross national income to Least Developed Countries, a target most donors fail to reach. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the main region of bilateral allocation excluding Ukraine, with approximately €840 million in 2023, or 22.7% of gross bilateral aid[10].

This distribution has nevertheless shifted significantly since 2022 due to the war in Ukraine. In 2023, ODA-eligible countries in Europe received approximately €750 million of Norwegian bilateral aid, of which 86.9% went to Ukraine[10]. In 2026, Ukraine is expected to receive approximately €1.3 billion, or 26.5% of the aid budget[11]. Minister Aukrust assumes this priority at the expense of part of the aid going to poorer countries, justifying that support for Ukraine has become an absolute priority of Norwegian foreign, security and development policy. This is one of the structural tensions of the current model: maintaining aid volume at 1% of GNI while absorbing massive support to a middle-income country.

Strong multilateral commitment, particularly to the World Bank and the UN system

Norway channels a very significant share of its aid through multilateral institutions. In 2023, it disbursed approximately €2.6 billion in gross aid to the multilateral system, a 40.2% real-terms increase over 2022[12]. This orientation reflects a stable political conviction: on cross-border challenges such as climate, global health, conflict or food security, multilateral institutions are the most effective instruments for pooling resources and multiplying impact.

The World Bank is the primary beneficiary of Norwegian aid. Norway is one of the main historical contributors to the International Development Association, the World Bank's arm that finances the world's 78 poorest countries through zero-interest loans or grants[13]. The Association operates through three-year replenishment cycles: for the 2026-2028 cycle, Norway announced in October 2024 a contribution of approximately €430 million, a nominal increase of 50% over the previous cycle[14].

The UN system is the other major multilateral channel. Norway is the largest core contributor to the United Nations Population Fund, with approximately €51 million disbursed in 2024 and 2025[4]. It is also among the largest donors to the World Food Programme, UNICEF, the UN Refugee Agency and the United Nations Development Programme.

Betting on multilateralism reflects an impact-driven logic: pooling resources to multiply the effect of every euro invested on challenges no single country can address alone.

Four thematic priorities: health, climate, gender equality, food security

Norway's development programme is structured around a few stable thematic priorities, consolidated over the past two decades.

Norway is a historical supporter of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculose and Malaria. Many of the programmes supported by these two organisations are considered Smart Buys: interventions delivering exceptionally high cost-impact ratios and robust development outcomes. The country also supports CEPI, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, headquartered in Oslo[15], which funds the development of vaccines against pathogens with high pandemic potential.

The Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, launched in 2008, disbursed approximately €2.9 billion over 2009-2021 to protect tropical forests in countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Gabon[16]. It is now one of the largest climate-forest programmes in the world. Norway is also a significant contributor to the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility.

Norwegian aid has historically been engaged on these issues. The country explicitly opposes restrictions on abortion promoted by certain other donors and in 2026 increased its support for women's rights by approximately €7 million[11].

Food security in low-income countries has become a growing priority since 2022. The war in Ukraine has significantly destabilised global markets for cereals and fertilisers, on which many net-importing African and Asian countries depend. Prices have soared, creating food crises in already vulnerable regions, particularly in East Africa and the Sahel. Norway has consequently strengthened its contributions to global food security programmes, notably to the World Food Programme and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

Norfund and the mobilisation of private capital

Beyond grants, Norway mobilises private capital to finance development through Norfund, its development finance institution. In 2021, Norfund invested approximately €456 million in companies in low- and middle-income countries, and mobilised approximately €120 million of additional private financing[17]. Private sector instruments represent 4.6% of Norwegian aid in 2024, compared with a DAC average of 1.3%[10].

This lever is expected to scale up in the coming years, notably through the Climate Investment Fund managed by Norfund, which invests in renewable energy in emerging countries.

Beyond generosity: the requirement for effectiveness as a new direction

2023: the Sending Report lays the foundations of a new investment framework

In June 2023, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published Investing in a common future, the report of an expert group chaired by Ole Jacob Sending, research director at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs[18]. The report proposes a redesign of the conceptual framework of Norwegian aid around a guiding principle: thinking of aid no longer as a gift, but as an investment in a common future, which must produce the highest possible social and environmental return.

This framework rests on three operational principles:

The report also proposes a recategorisation of aid into two blocks: category 1 brings together poverty reduction and humanitarian response, with strict application of ODA reporting rules and concentration on the poorest countries and fragile contexts; category 2 covers global public goods for development (climate, global health, biodiversity, peace), with greater flexibility in reporting rules. This distinction seeks to clarify what aid actually finances and to avoid dilution of objectives.

The report proposes, in the long term, doubling Norway's total development effort, aiming at 2% of GNI split between 1% of ODA in the strict sense and 1% of additional effort on global public goods, with a complementary ambition of mobilising 0.7% of GNI in private capital. This proposal is ambitious and has not been adopted as such by the government, which for the time being maintains the target at 1% of GNI. But the investment framework proposed by the report now permeates Norwegian aid doctrine.

2024-2026: operationalisation through the World Bank and partnership concentration

Several concrete decisions have translated this new direction into action over two years. The first is the increase in the contribution to the International Development Association for the 2026-2028 cycle, announced in October 2024: approximately €430 million, a nominal increase of 50% over the previous cycle[14]. This is a significant reorientation toward the multilateral channel identified as the most effective for reaching low-income countries, at a time when most other donors are reducing their contributions.

The second decision is the publication, on 20 March 2026, of the Strategy for Norway's cooperation with the World Bank 2026-2030[19]. This document, which responds to an explicit recommendation from the Norwegian National Audit Office, sets out for the first time a multiannual strategic framework for the relationship with Norway's main multilateral partner. The strategy puts forward three main orientations: strengthening the International Development Association as the pillar of aid to the poorest countries, concentrating thematic contributions on a few clear priorities (gender equality, climate and nature, renewable energy, decent work, food security), and working to reduce the fragmentation of agreements with the World Bank.

This last orientation responds to a diagnosis widely shared in the Norwegian public debate: the country manages a high number of bilateral agreements with its multilateral partners, which mobilises substantial administrative resources on both sides and limits strategic coherence. The think tank Langsikt, in a January 2025 note entitled Improving the efficiency of Norwegian aid through the UN and the World Bank, documented that Norway alone had more than 300 active agreements with the UN system, including 86 agreements with the United Nations Development Programme for a total amount of approximately €95 million in 2023[20]. The same note recalls that the administrative costs of the Trust Funds managed by the World Bank can vary from 6% to over 20% of the contribution, while the International Development Association operates with administrative costs of around 6% and benefits above all from the financial leverage enabled by capital markets. Strengthening this channel and reducing the number of thematic agreements with the World Bank is therefore an effectiveness decision.

2026-2027: Project Turning Point, toward a new white paper

On 19 January 2026, Minister of International Development Åsmund Aukrust announced the launch of Project Vendepunkt, translated as Project Turning Point[3]. It is a one-year consultation and reflection process that will result in the presentation of a comprehensive white paper to the Norwegian Parliament in spring 2027. This white paper will set the priorities of Norwegian aid for the coming years.

Minister Aukrust specified that the objective is not to reduce the volume of aid, which will remain at 1% of GNI, but to improve its effectiveness in a transformed international context. The massive cuts announced by other donors in 2025 and 2026, in particular the near-disappearance of American aid and the reduction of official development assistance by several European countries including France, have accelerated the need for Norway to clarify its own doctrine.

Four pillars structure this overhaul[21]. The first is strategic concentration: focusing on a smaller number of partners and priority countries rather than dispersing resources. The second is accountability and results: requiring every krone invested to produce measurable outcomes, within a rigorous evaluation logic. The third is the link with security: assuming that aid, by reducing fragilities, contributes to international stability and to Norway's own security. The fourth is partnership renewal, notably with emerging donors such as India, Indonesia or China, and with private actors.

Where other donors invoke effectiveness to justify cuts, Norway is making the opposite choice: maintaining the level of generosity, and ensuring that this effort produces the greatest possible difference for beneficiary populations.

Drawing inspiration from Norwegian international aid?

Norwegian international aid is of interest as much for its volume and level of generosity, maintained over fifty years, as for the coherence of its doctrine. While this 0.7% UN minimum was exceeded as early as 1980, and while most donors are reducing their commitments or subordinating them to short-term national interest logics, Norway maintains a 1% target and uses this volume to question the effectiveness of every euro invested.

What stands out in the Norwegian case is not only generosity, but the combination of this generosity with a growing methodological requirement. The 2023 Sending Report laid the foundations of an investment framework based on three simple principles: setting clear objectives, prioritising interventions whose effectiveness is demonstrated, and accepting to reduce administrative fragmentation to multiply real impact. The increase in the contribution to the International Development Association for 2026-2028, the publication of a multiannual strategy with the World Bank, and the launch of Project Turning Point are the first concrete translations of this framework.

The Norwegian case also reminds us that the effectiveness of aid is measured not only by what it finances, but by how it is governed. Three structuring choices deserve to be highlighted. First, the choice of a stable and predictable volume, allowing partner organisations to plan over several years. Second, the choice of strongly represented multilateral channels, with low administrative costs and high leverage, rather than a multiplication of bilateral thematic agreements. Third, the choice of aid delivered entirely as grants, which avoids accounting ambiguities linked to loans and ensures that declared effort matches actual effort.